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Introduction
In ‘When God Commands Disobedience’ (Clayton and Stevens 2014) we address 
the question of how Rawlsian political liberals should treat the religiously unrea-
sonable. The religiously unreasonable are those who, for reasons of religious faith 
or perceived divine command, reject one or more of the fundamental principles of 
society as a cooperative enterprise between free and equal people, and who may 
seek to change (or even punish) the political community in line with their compre-
hensive religious beliefs. We argue, first, that political liberals have weighty reasons 
to engage with the unreasonable. However, second, following Hobbes (1991) in 
observing that divine law trumps law enacted by humans, we argue that the response 
to those who claim to have theistic reasons for acts that are unreasonable by lib-
eral standards must be a theological one: political liberals must be prepared to offer 
a direct religious response. They must offer reasons aimed at establishing that the 
unreasonable are mistaken about the political implications of their religious doctrine 
or about the soundness of the particular religious doctrine they affirm. We then fur-
ther elaborate the nature of the proper religious response by defending a division 
of justificatory labour with respect to who should engage the religiously unreason-
able on such matters. We argue that politicians and political philosophers are not 
best placed to offer religious arguments. The danger would be that politicians and 
political philosophers risk, on the one hand, appearing sectarian if they commit 
publicly to a particular religious view, thus risking alienating other, reasonable, citi-
zens of faith, or (on the other hand) they risk appearing disingenuous by offering 
conditional responses about what others should believe about their faith (but which 
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they themselves do not in fact believe). Instead, we argue that the task of offering 
religious reasons would best be delegated to citizens themselves, particularly those 
reasonable citizens who share the same broad faith as those whom we hope to con-
vince. Such reasonable citizens are not subject to the same worries over alienation 
and disingenuousness, or at least not to the same degree.
In his reply, Wong (2018) takes issue with our view of the division of justificatory 
labour. Whilst Wong agrees with our argument for the need for a religious response 
to the religiously unreasonable, he disagrees that the division of labour we propose 
is warranted. He argues that we are too pessimistic in thinking that politicians and 
political philosophers are incapable of conditional or conjectural reasoning in the 
same way as reasonable religious citizens. Wong contends that an appropriately 
framed form of argument from conjecture—one that is sincere in the sense of being 
both honest in its intentions and open-minded—can escape the dilemma of aliena-
tion and disingenuousness.
We are grateful to Wong for his challenge to our argument for a division of jus-
tificatory labour. We will take the opportunity to set out in a little more detail our 
conception of how political liberals ought to engage with politically unreasonable 
religious individuals, and in doing so offer our response to his criticisms.
Belief Formation and Persuasion
We begin with some clarifications regarding the moral principles regulating belief-
formation, as well as the various strategies for persuasion. The purpose of engage-
ment with politically unreasonable religious individuals (hereafter, the unreason-
able) is to persuade them to change their beliefs such that their comprehensive 
religious convictions become consistent with liberal political principles. There are 
at least two weighty reasons to take steps to encourage the unreasonable to change 
their beliefs. First, it is valuable for our fellow citizens to come to see the worth of 
living in a society regulated by liberal principles because it makes their lives as citi-
zens go better. Evangelizing on behalf of liberal society might, therefore, be done 
out of a concern for our fellow citizens (Rawls 1996; Dworkin 2011, Ch. 9). Second, 
liberal principles require us to prevent social disruption or harm to others and one 
way of effecting that is by persuading unreasonable citizens of the benefits of living 
in a stable and flourishing liberal democracy.
Persuading individuals to bring their comprehensive convictions into line with 
liberal principles is generally preferable to other forms of belief formation or manip-
ulation of people’s behaviour. Of course, it is possible to alter the payoffs of the vari-
ous options available to someone (either by threats or incentives) such that, given 
her beliefs, she is led to behave differently; it is possible to ‘nudge’ people towards 
the right views or conduct by altering certain features of the choice architecture to 
shape their beliefs or behaviour; it may even become possible to change beliefs via 
direct neurointerventions into the brain (Clayton and Moles 2018). However, other 
things equal, persuasion is generally preferable to these other kinds of intervention 
because it leaves the individual free to come to see for herself that there are weighty 
reasons to endorse and live by liberal values. (Of course, if persuasion is ineffective, 
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other techniques of belief-formation and conduct-regulation, such as nudging or 
neurointerventions might be explored.)
Suppose, then, that liberal societies are duty-bound to seek to convert the unrea-
sonable to reasonable views by persuasion. It is important to explore how the bur-
dens of persuasion ought to be distributed. It might be thought that all reasonable 
persons share in this burden equally, given their participation in, and the benefits 
they receive from, the liberal political community. However, even if the moral 
requirement is, in principle, universal in this way, we might think the duty better 
discharged by some specific person or persons on behalf of the political community 
(perhaps with compensation from others for costs incurred). Such persons might 
include politicians and public officials, those with particular expertise in religious 
and moral knowledge, or reasonable citizens of faith. Given that many, if not most 
people, will lack sufficient specialist knowledge to engage in the task of such persua-
sion, some form of division of labour seems most beneficial.
If a division of justificatory labour is justifiable, then it is a further question which 
actors or group of actors are best suited to act as liberal persuaders. This, in turn, 
will dictate what kinds of persuasion or arguments will be optimal. Here we might 
conceive of the possibilities as falling into two broad camps: those external to the 
particular religious tradition or doctrine held by those whom we are attempting to 
persuade; those internal to that tradition, in that they share some (or all) of the basic 
premises of the faith held by those whom we seek to persuade.1 For example, in an 
attempt to persuade, say, adherents of a version of Christianity who reject one or 
more of the fundamental principles of liberal political morality that their interpreta-
tion of the faith is mistaken, internal persuaders would include, predominantly, other 
Christian citizens who share similar presuppositions or articles of faith. External 
persuaders, by contrast, would lack this shared set of presuppositions or beliefs, and 
reasoning would, as we argue in our earlier piece, likely take place on a conditional 
or conjectural basis. Those who may undertake this task externally would include 
politicians and public officials, political philosophers, and citizens of other (and no) 
faiths.
As an example of such an internal reformatory interpretation of a religious doc-
trine aimed at participating in an overlapping consensus on a liberal constitutional 
regime, Rawls cites the work of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (1990). We discuss 
this example from Rawls in our original article. As Rawls writes, for An-Na’im’s 
‘interpretation to be accepted by Muslims, it must be presented as the correct and 
superior interpretation of Shari’a’ (Rawls 1999, p. 590, n. 46). An-Na’im begins his 
attempt at liberal persuasion from an acceptance of the truth of Shari’a law and the 
Islamic faith.
The external persuader, by contrast, offers arguments based on premises that the 
conjecturer does not herself accept. Instead, she attempts to construct an argument 
from the point of view of a comprehensive conception she does not share, in order 
to persuade her unreasonable interlocutor that, on the basis of his view, he should 
endorse a liberal political morality. As illustration, Wong uses the 2015 address of 
1 See Schwartzman (2012) for a similar distinction between internal and external positions (esp. 534–
539).
276 M. Clayton, D. Stevens 
1 3
Bernie Sanders to the evangelical Christian institution, Liberty University. Whilst 
declaring his own position as that of a secularized Jew, Sanders argued that, from a 
Christian perspective, income inequality should be seen as one of the greatest moral 
issues of our time, and quoted New Testament passages in support of his interpreta-
tion of Christian requirements (see Wong 2018). Similarly, March (2009) provides 
another version of reasoning by conjecture, as a political philosopher who seeks to 
construct an interpretation of Islam conducive to forming an overlapping consensus 
on liberal political values and institutions.
We do not disagree with Wong (or Rawls) that external conjectural reasoning 
might be successful. However, which particular strategy is more likely to succeed is 
an empirical question, the best answer to which is one that is appropriately sensitive 
to various moral, social and political considerations. We argue that a division of jus-
tificatory labour that emphasizes internal engagement is, given those considerations, 
the optimal strategy.
Conjecture: Between Fact and Perception
To see why a strategy of internal engagement might be favoured over external con-
jectural reasoning, we might note a number of difficulties that the latter faces, but 
which are not faced—or faced to a lesser extent—by the former.
Persuasion by way of conjectural reasoning is a form of conditional argument, 
as we have seen. As Rawls states: ‘we argue from what we believe, or conjecture, 
are other people’s basic doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, 
despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political concep-
tion that can provide a basis for public reasons’ (Rawls 1999, p. 594). Our view is 
that when such conjectural reasons are offered by those external to a given religious 
doctrine, their motives may appear disingenuous to those whom they are trying to 
convince. This may be the case because such conjecturers are likely to be viewed as 
employing such a mode of reasoning for instrumental purposes. Or, such conjectur-
ers might be viewed as closed-minded—entering the discussion with, say, a pre-con-
ceived liberal-favouring interpretation of religious scripture. The unreasonable are 
unlikely to be persuaded by those whose motives they view with suspicion. Internal 
persuaders, by contrast, are less likely to encounter such degrees of suspicion on 
these counts.
Wong’s view is that an appropriately framed form of conjectural reasoning is 
capable of being both honest and open-minded. Politicians and political philoso-
phers who engage in conjecture must meet two jointly sufficient conditions. First, 
they should disclose their own actual beliefs (including their rejection of the beliefs 
held by the unreasonable) as well as their intentions for engaging in conjectural rea-
soning. This meets the condition for honesty. Second, they must be genuinely open 
to the possibility of revising their own views—even the possibility of abandoning 
their own reasonable liberal views—in light of compelling reasons or evidence as 
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part of that discussion. Not holding one’s views dogmatically, but being open to the 
possibility of change, meets the condition of open-mindedness.2
Our disagreement with Wong here is not about what would constitute conjectural 
reasoning, properly understood. Anyone who deliberately concealed their beliefs or 
intentions, or who was not open to the possibility of being wrong, would be reason-
ing in bad faith, and not engaged in the enterprise of reasoning from conjecture. As 
political liberals we should want citizens to be supportive of liberal political val-
ues and institutions for the right reasons, not through sleight of hand, or manipula-
tion. However, our original claim is that even if the conjecturer is sincere in her 
enterprise, there is no guarantee that those to whom such remarks and arguments 
are addressed will view them as sincere—we are, by hypothesis, in the realm of 
non-ideal theory. Whilst Wong’s remarks help clarify what properties conjectural 
reasoning, properly understood, must contain, it is perfectly possible for someone 
to satisfy that test, yet still appear disingenuous to the person they are trying to per-
suade. There is a crucial distinction, then, between what we might call the fact of 
disingenuousness and the perception that it obtains. From the strategic perspective 
of trying to generate support for liberal political values and institutions for the right 
reasons, it is the latter that is of vital importance.
So, even where the reasoner by conjecture is being sincere in the relevant sense, 
her intervention might be taken to be disingenuous by the unreasonable. We shall 
offer four explanations: the perception of bias; the perception of arrogance; the per-
ception of insincerity; and, the perception of a lack of credibility.
The Perception of Bias
Despite giving assurances of honesty and open-mindedness, the belief that the con-
jecturers are biased is likely to remain. Given the fact that the liberal is engaging 
in a deliberate and open attempt to change beliefs, the person who is the target of 
that attempt may well interpret that instrumental aim as clouding the judgment of 
the conjecturer. Even if the conjecturer claims to be open-minded and open to hav-
ing her views changed, the unreasonable might hold the epistemic worry that such 
bias, whether intentional or unintentional, is unavoidable (see Schwartzman 2012, 
pp. 531–532). Where the liberal purports to offer an unbiased interpretation of their 
texts, the unreasonable are simply likely to dispute that such an unbiased view is 
possible. Some Christian apologists who enter into public debates with non-believ-
ers will, for example, debate the existence of a Deity and various scientific and met-
aphysical claims about the nature of the world and universe, but refuse to debate 
scriptural or doctrinal issues with non-Christians on the basis that their bias prevents 
them from engaging genuinely and sincerely with believers. Similarly, although 
Wong’s example of Bernie Sanders has some of the traction it does because of the 
doctrinal similarities and historical connectedness of Judaism and Christianity. 
When Sanders reasons from conjecture about what Christians should believe, given 
2 See also Scwartzman’s (2012) discussion of sincerity and disclosure (esp. 529–532).
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the articles of their faith, many Christian listeners would likely perceive less bias in 
Sanders than, say, if a Muslim or atheist had attempted a similar enterprise.3 Here, 
we should conclude that the intentions of the speaker are not sufficient to allay the 
charge of disingenuousness. Conversely, an internal engager is less likely to suffer 
from charges of bias on the grounds of arguing from grounds they do not accept, or 
from purely instrumental and biased interpretations. Although such charges might 
be, and no doubt are, levelled against co-religionists, the traction of such accusations 
is less than it is against outsiders to the shared faith.
The Perception of Arrogance
The second form of perceived insincerity is that of arrogance. When the conjec-
turer offers reasons to the unreasonable for thinking they have misunderstood their 
own faith, the conjecturer runs the risk of being perceived as arrogant or conceited, 
or possessing a sense of superiority. When politicians state in public what the true 
meaning of Christianity or Islam is, they can appear crass or rude, as well as con-
descending, telling those who have spent their lives living the experience of being a 
Christian or Muslim that they know less about the proper meaning of their faith than 
someone with little or no comparative experience.
The Perception of Insincerity
The admission of not sharing the beliefs from which reasoning will begin can, itself, 
reinforce the perception of insincerity. The conjecturer may be perceived as holding 
back on what they really think of the unreasonable person’s beliefs for the sake of 
trying to manufacture some kind of political consensus no matter how silly or mis-
guided they do in fact think those beliefs are. Simply adding to this some declaration 
of honesty about what one actually believes of their interlocutor’s view may worsen 
this perception even further. Someone who says, for example, ‘I do not share your 
belief in reason R, and I think there are very good reasons and evidence to think R 
is false, but if I did believe in R, then I would see it as supportive of a liberal politi-
cal morality on account of considerations C’, may meet the criteria for honesty and 
open-mindedness, but may also seem to their interlocutor as lacking even less com-
mitment to the worth of the view they are aiming to engage with.
The Perception of a Lack of Credibility
Relatedly, when those outside a given religion engage in conjectural reasoning, they 
may be viewed as lacking sufficient credibility for their arguments to be given any 
weight or consideration. Perceived disingenuousness in this sense can be seen as 
3 This may be increasingly the case given a significant movement within (particularly American) evan-
gelical Christianity—so called ‘Christian Zionism’—that is supportive of the Jewish state of Israel, and 
the place of Jews in eschatological views, based on certain (Christian) biblical prophecy.
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the conjecturer not having paid her dues in coming to understand and appreciate the 
faith from within; that they are not native to the faith. This lack of credibility may 
have several dimensions to it. First, any external interlocutor or conjecturer, however 
knowledgeable and good her reasoning, may lack credibility, because the particular 
faith group does not see her intervention as having authority. Many religions con-
tain, as a component of their faith, content-independent reasons for belief, such as 
deference to de facto intellectual authorities. For example, the Pope is considered 
by those who follow the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church as the inerrant 
voice of theological and moral authority to whom their judgement on certain matters 
must be surrendered. If such de facto authorities provide reasons for belief that are 
independent of the content of those beliefs, then conjecturing on the basis of those 
beliefs will largely miss the point, and will be very unlikely to succeed at persuasion.
Second—and questions of deference to authority aside—the views of some peo-
ple receive greater attention, or are given greater weight, than the views of others 
in virtue of their place or role (or lack thereof). For instance, some believe that the 
views of the devout carry more weight than the views of those who lack faith or rev-
elation. Where this is the case, the person who engages in conjectural reasoning may 
provide a better or more accurate interpretation of religious scripture or require-
ments, but will still be viewed as an interloper who is meddling in issues they really 
do not understand. Issues of standing, like the issue of authority, will turn on reasons 
for belief that are quite independent of the content of those religious beliefs.4
These content-independent reasons notwithstanding, there are several problems 
with conjecture on content-dependent grounds. To be credible, the conjecturer must 
surpass some threshold of knowledge or understanding for their arguments to carry 
any weight with the faithful. Ignorant interventions, or arguments based on what 
the believer considers to be simple misconstruals of essential points that betoken a 
lack of understanding or impartiality, are not likely to encourage the taking of the 
conjecturing seriously. When politicians pronounce on the correct interpretation of 
a religious view that they quite obviously do not share, they appear disingenuous 
because of a lack of credibility to make such judgements, even if their verdict hap-
pens to be correct.
As Schwartzman notes, one way to respond to the lack of credibility challenge 
is for the conjecturer to lay out their scholarly credentials (Schwartzman 2012, p. 
541). A genuine and concerted effort over an extended period of time to learn about 
a given faith is about as much as anyone external to the faith can do to gain such 
credibility. Such knowledge, if necessary for conjecturing is costly to come by, and 
unlikely to be possessed by politicians and political philosophers. Only a few spe-
cialists, such as March’s (2009) work on Islam and Rawlsian political liberalism, 
may exist. Even here, however, this may not be enough for some who hold unrea-
sonable views. It may be objected by the devout that it is impossible to understand 
4 One form of example of this kind of rejection is listed by renowned biblical scholar Bart D. Erhman, 
who reports that a familiar reaction among Christian adherents to his historical research is one of dis-
missal on the grounds that Erhman himself lacks the necessary faith to be a legitimate authority (Erhman 
2010).
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their religious view sufficiently without the experience of living as a devout believer 
oneself. It is sometimes claimed, for example, that it is impossible properly to grasp 
the Islamic faith without being able to read the Qu’ran in its Arabic form; reading it 
in translation is insufficient to convey its full and true meaning and import. If this is 
the view held by the unreasonable, then there is little the external conjecturer can do 
other than protest that the threshold is set unreasonably high, and that a view that is 
incapable of being explained to, or learned about to a satisfactory degree, by those 
not raised in it is hardly a suitable basis for the exercise of public political power 
(Schwartzman 2012, pp. 541–542). Moreover, we might wonder, in conjectural 
terms, whether an all-powerful God who deems his message to provide such a basis, 
is incapable of conveying that message in more than one language. Notwithstanding 
these replies, however, many unreasonable citizens will be unmoved by them and 
continue to doubt the credibility of external interlocutors.
Weighing the Costs
Such challenges—the perceptions of bias, arrogance, sincerity and credibility—are 
less likely to be faced by those internal to a given religious set of beliefs. Many 
believers will pass the necessary thresholds to have their arguments considered. This 
is not, of course, automatically the case. Much that passes as religious debate within 
a single denomination, such as Protestant Christianity, focuses upon the denuncia-
tion of the interlocutor as a heretic or false Christian, despite an apparent acceptance 
of the major articles of faith. Sometimes the narcissism of small differences can be 
a greater barrier to persuasion than the differences between faiths (see Stevens and 
O’Hara 2015, Ch. 4). Our claim is that this is less often the case, and that persuasion 
from within is, given the non-normative facts in play, more likely to succeed.
In addition, as we suggested above, it is important to consider the costs of per-
suasion. Even if external reasoning from conjecture could succeed, the considerable 
costs that would have to be incurred to avoid the problems of bias, arrogance, sincer-
ity and credibility suggest that the rational choice of a liberal community would be 
to adopt the ‘persuasion begins at home’ division of labour we propose. Such a divi-
sion does not necessarily place all the burdens of conjecture on a particular section 
of the community. In a multicultural society there are very many religious and non-
religious communities, each of which has unreasonable as well as reasonable mem-
bers. Accordingly, reasonable citizens holding different comprehensive conceptions 
should discharge their duties of engagement by engaging with those who share some 
of their comprehensive convictions. In cases in which, because unreasonableness is 
not evenly distributed between comprehensive doctrines, there exists an inequality 
of the burdens of persuasion, measures must be put in place to compensate those 
who take on greater burdens.
Finally, we should note that our argument is not that such persuasion is only pos-
sible from within a particular community or religious tradition: that any kind of 
external attempts, even to persuade members on their own terms, is a kind of cul-
tural imposition that brings values and modes of thought and interaction alien to 
that tradition. Reasoning from conjecture, properly construed, deliberately refrains 
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from arguing against the fundamental starting points, and accepts them for the sake 
of argument, with the aim of ‘clear[ing] up what we take to be a misunderstanding 
on others’ part, and perhaps equally on ours’ (Rawls 1999, p. 594). Our objection 
is not one of principle, but of pragmatism. Internal persuasion is more likely to be 
effective in achieving the desired end. This would be fully consistent with affirming 
external conjectural reasoning as the most likely method to succeed in those cases 
where internal persuasion is impossible or counter-productive. Where individuals 
internal to the view might face significant personal costs for engaging in such argu-
mentation—perhaps being ostracized, branded as heretics, or worse—or where the 
views of adherents lack a certain authority in such matters—then conjectural rea-
soning may be a better method of proceeding (see Schwartzman 2012, p. 539). The 
kinds of cases we are imagining however—those that are the mainstay of disputes in 
our own democratic societies—are not predominantly of this kind.
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